Home | MyMauMau: Log In / Register | Ask Franny
Log In / Register | Feb 9, 2010

Conglomerate Investing: Cash Cow or Franchise Fizzle?

NEW YORK (Blue MauMau) - Is buying a franchise unit from a holding company that contains various brands a good or bad idea? Some franchise experts are saying that buyers should be wary.

Franchise conglomerates, those holding companies that own multiple franchise systems and brands, can buy various brands within their own niche, such as Raving Brands buying restaurant brands. Or conglomerates can be as diversified as athletic shoes and ice cream, as troubled NexCen Brands is. And such firms have been making the news with increasing frequency of late, like the announcement of insolvency issues at NexCen, the acquisition of Wendy’s by Triarc or an aggressive selling presence at this year’s International Franchise Expo.

Boom of Buying Brands Now a Bust

Darren Tristano, Executive Vice President for Technomic, Inc., a restaurant and vendor consultancy that tracks the 500 largest restaurant chains, thinks there has been a surge of franchise conglomerates over the past few years. Tristano states, “If you go back about 10 years, there was a trend by the major chains to really go after different non-competitive brands within their portfolio. This occurred within full service and limited service [restaurants].”

Tristano says that franchisors saw having multi-brands as a benefit to franchisees. “If you look at McDonald’s, they acquired Boston Market, Donato’s Pizza and Chipotle.” He continues, “What they were trying to do was give their franchisees an opportunity to own other restaurants within their area without being competitive with the McDonald’s brand.”  

But where conglomerates were once buying companies, they now are trimming down.

Bruce Schaeffer, president of Franchise Valuations Ltd, whose practice of providing valuations, expert testimony and opinions about the “fair price” of franchise companies has put him in a position to follow the finance, accounting and tax aspects of franchising and the economy for 30 years. He observes, “the small boom in franchise conglomerate mergers and acquisition of franchise brands has become a bust in 2008.”

“All of the low-hanging fruit of good deals in available franchise opportunities was picked two to four years ago because the cheap money financing of 2006 and 2007 is but a memory, gone with the wind,” Schaeffer declares.

Technomic’s Tristano also thinks the future of these franchise conglomerates is shifting away from multi-brands. He states, “Over the course of time, we’ve seen Wendy’s move in that direction with Tim Horton’s, Baha Fresh, Café Express, Pasta Bravo. But nothing has really come about and they have divested from that.”

Blue MauMau photo"Take a look at a Kahala, Raving Brands or even Yum,” Tristano says. “Yum has indicated that they are going to move away from their co-branding. They want to strengthen their brand without being the dual or tri-branded units.”

Scott Haner, Vice President of Franchise Development for Yum Brands interjects, “It is true that we do not have as many [brand] combinations as in the past. We have found the ones that work best with our customers and we are aggressively expanding them.”

Other conglomerates are also trimming off brands while trying to focus on what works.

“When you look at Raving Brands, they had a great concept to stay within fast casual and offer lots of different things,” says Tristano. “They’ve since sold off Mama Fu’s. They’ve sold Moe’s. They are now working on smaller concepts. So they’ve gone from a company that wanted to achieve a billion dollars in sales to a company that creates brands and sells them. Franchisors can make money doing that. But they’ve shifted.”

Problems

Franchise buyers understandably are cynical about buyouts of other brands.

For one, franchise operators can be greatly impacted when their franchise system changes management, organizational structure and sometimes even brand name, which means replacing signage. Acquisitions are often touted as creating “synergy”, which seems to be corporate code word for managers who have seen too many fairy tale movies and think that they only have to kiss the ugly frog of a franchise brand to distill their management magic that will unleash the prince inside.

Rebel Cole, associate professor of Finance at DePaul University and a consultant of central banking systems around the world, views the value proposition as particularly poor for franchise holding companies with brands in unrelated industries. Cole states, “The finance literature on conglomerates is pretty clear; they destroy rather than create value. I would look for someone to take apart these new conglomerates during the next few years, especially now that the credit markets have tightened so much during the past year. My guess is that they are highly leveraged and will have trouble renewing their financing when it comes time to do so.”

Franchise attorney Keith Kanouse of Kanouse & Walker, P.A., warns, “There are a lot of small- and medium-sized franchisors that are floundering because they do not adequately service and support their franchisees. A lot of these companies are buying into conglomerates because of back office support, or other ways in which they have economies and buy a royalty stream. What if your system is second cousin in that the other brands get priority? You don’t have your franchisor opening the same brand, but rather it is a different brand but the same franchisor. That can create some cannibalization, where the other brands on the same street can hurt the individual franchisee, but overall doesn’t hurt the franchisor because its revenue base grows through its acquisitions and expanded brand concepts.”

Franchise owner-operators and potential buyers may want to watch the financial health of their franchisor when an acquisition occurs. Says Mr. Schaeffer, “The real question is what makes you think any merger or acquisition of a franchise brand in any franchise sector is worth contemplating in light of the just issued KPMG study that shows that only about 17% of all M&A transactions increase profits for the acquirer.”

Benefits

Acquisitions of franchise companies and brands make sense in certain situations. Kanouse, who acts as counsel for Diversified Health and Fitness, a holding company of five brands, states, “Mergers can combine back office operations and reduce cost.”

A franchisor with fewer costs can translate into lower fees for franchise owner-operators to support the system. A study has shown that combining back-office operations, eliminating redundancies, rather than promises of vast growth, are more likely to be successful. Kanouse elaborates that in various franchise sectors this can be marketing and other services when brand concepts are similar. Conglomerates can help consolidate and lower the “costs of field support, back-office support, making reservations, and passing on sales leads.”

Kanouse adds, “If you are buying different concepts in different industries, you should have separate field support. I would imagine that franchisors would want more economies of scale in their field support by having more outlets that they have to service and support in a given location to cut down the drive time. If the concepts are nearly identical, I don’t see why a field rep couldn’t handle different ones.”

What should an investor of a franchise unit look for in large multi-branded conglomerates?

Investors of businesses and consultants look for firms that “stick to the knitting,” focusing on what they know best. This mantra is best known among managerial leaders from the 1982 book In Search of Excellence, by Tom Peters and Robert Waterman. Peters and Waterman warned how easy it was for companies that had a diversified portfolio to be the jack of all trades and master of none.

Franchise experts warn of portfolio companies who think that they are masters at selling franchises and back office functions, no matter what business the franchise operations carry out.

Tristano advises to look at three things when considering a franchise that is under a conglomerate. He thinks it is important to first look at the segment. In restaurants, that means whether it is quick service or full service. Tristano observes, “Quick service offers much greater value, and it will continue to grow, not at the pace we’ve seen for the last ten years, but at a rate that will outpace full service.”

The second thing to look at is how the brands fit together. Are they really competitive? Are they well suited? Was there a good strategy on how they were acquired? Did they pick the right brands, turn around some of the brands that they have and to build success on that?

Tristano observes, “Kahala can now co-brand with Cold Stone Creamery and Cereality to be able to hit different day parts. I think what is part of their strategy is that if you have something that does well during breakfast, but does nothing at dinner, you co-brand to be something to everyone throughout the day instead of just Cereality that is open in the morning or Cold Stone that is midafternoon to night. So if you are able to combine some of these and hit multiple day parts with one fixed unit, you’ll have more success.”

And lastly it is track record—the management of the business and the financial performance of any investor in terms of going forward and looking at the upside. Here's a recap:

  1. Look first at whether the franchise system is in a growth segment

  2. Look into how the brands fit for you—the owner operator. Do they compete with you or will they make a good co-brand expansion? Are the brands in the conglomerate a good fit for you as the franchise operator to build your business?

  3. Look at the financial track record and management leadership of the franchisor and its holding company

Buyers should watch out for problem brands in the portfolio because the holding company may have to devote considerable resources to their problem child.

Tristano observes, "When franchisors have eight, nine, or ten brands, unfortunately, the loser brands require the most attention. The troublesome kids are always 80–90% of the work, while franchisors tend to leave alone stars. If franchisors have a star brand, they should be focusing attention on that. It’s kind of like restaurants. When you have weak performers, you close them down. When conglomerates have strong performers, they should try to understand what the brand is doing right and try to replicate their success."

Yum Brands’ Haner adds that a buyer should look at brand winners that customers want. “Yum is different than many others in that when we talk about multi-branding we talk about two distinct brands to the customer but only one restaurant operational system for the operator. When we started, multi-branding was unique to certain companies that had a portfolio of brands. We believe our portfolio is the best portfolio for multi-branding because it allows the franchise investor to have leading brands in very popular categories in America. For example, when you put KFC and Taco Bell together, you get the leader in the chicken category and in the Mexican QSR category, and you get complimentary brands that give you lunch, dinner and late night appeal.”

5
Your rating: None Average: 5 (2 votes)
  • Franchise topic:

13 Comments

Comment viewing options

Select your preferred way to display the comments and click "Save settings" to activate your changes.
Comglomerate Investing by Guest
Conflict of interest is the real question to look at before you buy. A conglomerate that has several similar brands can lead to something like Dairy Queen franchisees are facing as their franchisor combines Orange Julius, is it a good move – only time will tell. Another issue is when a franchisor is also in direct competition with their franchisees, ala UPS. There the franchisor has very different goals that appear to be in direct conflict with their fiduciary responsibility to franchisees – again time will tell.
Investing in a franchise with a multi-branded franchisor by Don Sniegowski
Don Sniegowski's picture
Investing in a franchise with portfolio companies that have a portfolio of brands is a complex topic. NexCen Brands is struggling. Availability of capital is scarce. Some multi-brand franchisors are shrinking their inventory of brands. Others thrive. Why? Are the experts in the article right? What should an investor watch out for with conglomerates that manage a portfolio of different franchise brands? I hope experts and business leaders will chime in to lead an insightful yet possibly discordant discussion on investing in a franchise with a multi-branded franchisor.
Franchise Conglomerate Investing: by Bob Snelling

Others commentary on the complex topic of franchise conglomerates speak to a number of important considerations.  I might add that in addition to industry and potential economies of scale considerations, the historic purpose and culture of a franchise acquisition or merger target should be equally evaluated. 

Business owners choose franchising over traditional business models for two primary reasons:

  1. Brand expansion utilizing the capital and labor supplied by a network of independent franchisees and/or
  2. Local ownership advantage of franchisees being more committed to success than non-owner staff.  These and other purpose driven considerations heavily contribute to the formation of Franchise Cultures.

If you believe as I do that a franchise culture can be reasonably defined as:  The sum of, and interrelation between, key elements of the franchisor and its franchisee network, which differentiate them from all other franchised and traditional businesses, and which tend to perpetuate through time and through successive generations of franchisor and franchisee ownership and staff in the absence of change resulting from internal and/or external influences, then you may also believe that tampering with an acquired or merged franchise culture that has evolved over years or even decades, can be a significant challenge, with exponentially complex and variable results.

Many franchise systems such as brand intensive retail chains start out with franchising due to a lack of capital and a desire for quick expansion, but do not necessarily benefit from an exclusive franchise arrangement forever because a well developed brand brings in most clients and the units are relatively easy to manage and staff.  Business-to-business franchise concepts, in addition to requiring expansion capital, can also be tailor made for franchising because they are more complex and benefit from business savvy franchisees building local books of business, which are not as easily managed, staffed or replaced from a distant corporate headquarters.  

It bears reiterating that the historic purpose and culture of a franchise should be as carefully evaluated and comprehended as the success of its brand, financials, operating systems, and franchisee base. 

Unfortunately, there are a lot less experts in the field of franchise cultures running around than there are sales, financial and operations guru’s, and those that are available are usually scooped up by fortune 100 and 500 companies that can both afford and see the wisdom in maintaining such talent on staff.  The vast majority of franchise systems, without consideration to their size, cannot afford to maintain non-revenue producing leaders and management, especially at the level of cultural expertise that for instance a General Electric can.

No easy answers I am afraid. Sadly, franchise conglomerates are thus relegated to success based more on trial and error and luck than on planning. 

On the bright side, should the pendulum swing back from conglomerates towards individual franchise system ownership, it may result in more franchise leaders taking heed and openly sharing and discussing the makeup and influence that franchise cultures can and do wield, rather than falsely believing, as is apparenlty popular today, that a quick change of leadership is all that is necessary to change a culture.  One has to look no further than Washington to see that such is not the case.

--

Bob Snelling is president and co-founder of Honor Capital Group, LLC a franchise finance intermediary and consultant.  Bob’s involvement with franchising spans 35 years as prior co-owner and 15 years as prior senior level executive, CEO and director of Snelling Personnel Services, a national, and for many years international and publicly held franchise system with hundreds of franchised and company owned units, lead by the Snelling family for over 50 years until its sale in 2005, and which continues to operate today.

Beginnings of Change - Why and Why Now? by Don Sniegowski
Don Sniegowski's picture
"Sadly, franchise conglomerates are thus relegated to success based more on trial and error and luck than on planning." - Bob Snelling

Before franchise owners can adopt a new view of the future and to invest of their own capital to help achieve that future, they must be convinced. And that is the problem.

What we often see in the news are the franchise equivalent to civil war, where large groups of owners are not only unconvinced but worse, highly distrustful of the leadership of their franchise system of the changes to the system they are making. You can almost hear the arguments from franchise owners crying out how generous corporate management is with the franchisee's money.

Jonathan Day and Michael Jung of McKinsey & Company wrote an article for the McKinsey Quarterly on "Corporate Transformation without a Crisis", that provide insights to franchise systems. When a  new course must be plotted, an army of franchisor employees, franchise owners and their employees must adopt a new view of the future. If behavioral change is needed, then those involved must have conviction of where they are going. If strategy is formed in a bubble, companies won't even get out of the starting gate in answering these fundamental points of persuasion:

"Before employees [franchise owner-operators] can arrive at this deep conviction, three things must be absolutely clear to them. First, the “why” of the transformation program, as well as the “why now,” must persuade them; the benefits of success and the penalties for failing to act must be equally obvious. Second, the company’s new future—the “where to”—must be clear and exciting to everyone. Third, each employee must understand the personal benefits of the program: the leadership must have credible answers to that natural question, “What’s in it for me?” To inspire genuine conviction, the program’s rationale and goal must withstand the toughest scrutiny from the most cynical observer right from the start. (McKinsey Report, Quarter 4)

Those are the first answers that franchise owners and investors will want explained to them on why the company is contemplating change. But mustering up good arguments that have their roots with the realities of franchise operations is still nothing but the initial steps.

What surprises me is how many firms have difficulty explaining to the industry's own trade journals and franchise investors on the questions above.

Question: What are some things that you listen for when a conglomerate is contemplating change, such as a new brand model, merger, acquisition, selling parallel products in the neighborhood grocery store or having you open 24 hours?

Changing a Franchise Network's Culture by Don Sniegowski
Don Sniegowski's picture

"tampering with an acquired or merged franchise culture that has evolved over years or even decades, can be a significant challenge, with exponentially complex and variable results." - Bob Snelling

The topic of acquiring new franchise cultures and transforming the mindset of franchise networks is rarely seen in news and analytical articles in trade journals covering franchising. I suspect Bob, a franchise veteran from a family of franchise veterans, hit the nail on the head when he explains why. "The vast majority of franchise systems, without consideration to their size, cannot afford to maintain non-revenue producing leaders," observes Mr. Snelling.

What often comes across in cases of franchise failure are private and public statements from senior officers "on the balcony", who comment how franchisees just don't see the big picture. Or there is an angry rumbling from "the dance floor" on the failure of a 200 or 1000 franchise unit system to change because  those on the balcony didn't understand the dance floor.

"On the balcony" is a term that Ron Heifetz, an expert on leadership at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, uses to discuss the need for leaders and participants to combine frenetic activity on the "dance floor" with reflective observation from the "balcony above". 

From my viewpoint as someone who monitors franchise news and with my own background in organizational development and change management in Fortune 500 companies, transformation among large companies and especially franchise networks is tough. Darn tough. Yet few CEOs are talking about the cultural aspects that may make or break change when they acquire a new network or have goals to transform an old one.

There are metrics to help benchmark where culturally the organization is, where the industry is and where you want to go. There are also methodologies that can help everyone get on the same page. And then there are issues of structural alignment in the organization. Yet I rarely hear these things discussed in a robust way, other than franchise leaders saying that they frequently meet with their franchise advisory councils and field ops managers to affect the changes they want in their network. Such statements remind the listener / reader of a basketball player saying, "The secret to our success is that we got out there and gave it 110%."

Sophisticated purchasers of franchise businesses want to hear these issues of transforming corporate cultures discussed intelligently.

(Yes, I am thinking that this might very well be a good topic for a future piece. I have heard the issue of corporate culture and franchise structural alignment brought up once with a much admired franchise conglomerate. That may be a good place to start.)

Changing owners of multibrand hotel conglomerates by Guest
This is a big issue in the hotel industry. For example, I buy a Holiday Inn license from Intercontinental Hotels for Macon, GA. One year later, they sell a Holiday Express license to someone else. Two years later, they may sell a license for a Staybridge Suites hotel. This drives franchisees nuts for hotel companies that hotel multiple brands.
Re: Changing owners of multibrand hotel conglomerates by Guest
...
It's also a big issue in any conglomerate organization. by RichardSolomon
RichardSolomon's picture

The theory is that if these brands could infiltrate your market as independents, what's the issue if they do so as part of one organization?

Your contract doesn't provide you with any territorial protection against other brands, even if the other brands are owned by your own franchisor.

The flip side of that theory is that if there is a good location there being left open, someone else will take it if I don't - no harm, no foul.

We aren't married. It's just a business deal that has discrete terms that you agreed to. It's not like we were a family and I was running around on you.

Lawyers think of this as simply following natural market forces, and have provided in the franchise agreements for this to be facilitated without giving rise to claims over it.

Hotel owners are not your poor grunts with no business experience. They are more likely to be sophisticated investors (except of course for the bottom level motel crowd). As such, they don't tend to get the pity portion of judicial relief. Most hotel owner plaintiffs are wealthier than the judge who is deciding the case. Let's think reality here, OK?

The absentee owner hotel franchisees tend to be thought of as even less in need of judicial relief, as the hotel in question is usually not your bread and butter, without which you might miss a meal.

That leaves negotiation as almost the only avenue of accomodation. What dwells on that avenue is usually going to be an RFR (right of refusal) arrangement in which you might get the first right to put another hotel in the new location if you don't want someone else to have it. And that road wil only be open to someone who has kept close care of the relationship with the franchisor. Don't forget that this is the era of "power franchising" in which I can do anything my contract does not prohibit - with no other considerations required.

There are a case or two out there that seem to make the landscape brighter than I am describing. Don't you bet on it. Those are old cases.

--

Richard Solomon, FranchiseRemedies.com,  has over 45 years experience with franchise litigation and crisis management. He is a graduate of The Citadel and The University of Michigan Law School


Richard Solomon, FranchiseRemedies.com,  has over 45 years experience with franchise litigation and crisis management. He is a graduate of The Citadel and The University of Michigan Law School
Multi Brand/Conglomerate investing by RichardSolomon
RichardSolomon's picture

Schaeffer and Cole have a thorough understanding of this. The answer to all the questions raised is, "It depends".

A client of mine went through 168 acquisitions in eight years. That was in the 60s when the conglomerate theory was that if you could manage cash flow you could hire worker bees to do everything else - big Harvard B School theory. All life was just one big N Game.

My client's experience was exactly what we are seeing in franchising now [My client was not into franchising at all - no acquisition was a franchise operation]

There are some spectacular situations in which it is easier to predict critical failure, due mainly to the fact that the executives/major equity investors are little more than raiders with very near term exit strategies - hit and run folks. Some of the worst are mentioned in the article above.

The term conglomerate encompases concentric or product/service extension acquititions; geographic extension acquititions that are really just territory expansion in the same or very similar business; and those that are really diversification, which I would consider very high risk. In my client's case, those later divested for reasons of failure had little connection to the business of the acquiror. Most sold into markets unserved by the acquiror before the acquisition, or through channels of distribution that were not compatible/no scale economies were available from same channel efficiencies. If you buy into that situation, you are not risk averse or you simply don't appreciate the nature and quality of the risk.

Back office scale economies are great only if the brand performances are great.

On the other hand, a really horizontal acquiror that only buys competitors is certainly no guaranty of success. Consider the Popeys acquisition of Church's Chicken, for example - but personalities played a major part in that debacle for the franchisor. Most of the Popeye franchisees did well.

YUM Brands is exceptional. YUM is chock full of excellent brand manager mentalities. No one does it like they do. But even then, investing in one of their concepts should only be done by someone with actual experience in the business. Also, their very successful brands aint cheap. That means that they are dealing in the main with deeper pocket franchisees than your typical one store sandwich person. Panera Bread (not a conglomerate yet), for example, sells mainly to area developers with prior relevant experience.

If you buy a franchise from an "old established firm" the originator of the firm may be getting long in the tooth and looking for a way out. That means that you are dealing with bean counters more than brand managers post sale - usually not a harbinger of greatness.

Net position is that conglomeration has not changed one iota from the old days when we used to walk around every day with a shopping list of potential target acquisitions. That deluge was my entree into due diligence.

My personal belief is that a one brand franchisor needs to look at expansion when he has a few hundred franchisees doing well. A financially healthy corps of franchisees who have not been mistreated badly does represent a natural market for your next wave concept. No one can make it over the long term as a one trick pony. As a potential franchisee, a company where the first business franchisees are investing in the franchisor's next concept is a much better bet.

Since I'm always just the lawyer/advisor and never an investor, to me it's just fun. For an investor franchisee, the due diligence is at least as qualitatively critical as your more risky single concept franchise organizations.--

Richard Solomon, FranchiseRemedies.com,  has over 45 years experience with franchise litigation and crisis management. He is a graduate of The Citadel and The University of Michigan Law School


Richard Solomon, FranchiseRemedies.com,  has over 45 years experience with franchise litigation and crisis management. He is a graduate of The Citadel and The University of Michigan Law School
OOPS by RichardSolomon
RichardSolomon's picture

That was 68 acquisitions in eight years, not 168. Sorry folks.--

Richard Solomon, FranchiseRemedies.com,  has over 45 years experience with franchise litigation and crisis management. He is a graduate of The Citadel and The University of Michigan Law School


Richard Solomon, FranchiseRemedies.com,  has over 45 years experience with franchise litigation and crisis management. He is a graduate of The Citadel and The University of Michigan Law School
Wyndham Worldwide acquires hotel brands by Juan F
Juan F's picture

More news of franchise conglomerate companies.

Forbes reported on Monday that Wyndham Worldwide, a large umbrella company that contains numerous hotel franchise brands, has acquired U.S. Franchise Systems' two hotel brands, Microtel Inns & Suites and Hawthorn Suites.

Wyndham expects the acquisition to be completed within 60 days.

It should be noted that USFS has been named a Best Practice Champion by the American Hotel Foundation, and were the first hotel company to receive the Fair Franchising Seal from the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers (AAFD).

Kahala Wants Samurai Sam's to Rebrand by Bob Frankman
Bob Frankman's picture

More news in the last 24 hours on multi-brand conglomerates . . .

Kahala Corp, a company of some 13 franchise brands, doesn't have Samurai Sam's quite right. Brand president Sean Wieting spoke to Chain Leader about how the chain of 78 franchises and one corporate restaurant has been experimenting in Los Angeles with an Asian fusion concept. Wieting declares the chain will be rebranded from Samurai Sam's Teriyaki Grill to include more than just Japanese food so that it is not so similar to current competitors.

Kahala wants to be the first national chain to have its franchise owners try an Asian fusion concept of Chinese, Thai, Japanese and other menu items.

"The fusion concept is something that has been growing throughout the country in small pockets, but no large group has tried to capitalize on that."

Franchise owners will use new decor, floors, countertops, etc. Franchising since 2003, Samurai Sam's is a young system of franchise owners. The firm is trying to keep costs down for the new look.

"We're evaluating all pieces of the decor including our product photography, the floors, countertops, everything, because we're also looking at bringing our cost of entry for this concept to as low a cost of entry as we can."

The reasons above are all I could glean from the article on why Kahala wants to rebrand.

Metromedia Denies Bankruptcy Filings by Bob Frankman
Bob Frankman's picture

Count one more franchise conglomerate in trouble.  The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday that MRG was in talks with lender GE Capital Solutions to avoid a possible bankruptcy filing.

Metromedia Restaurant Group, parent to the Bennigan's, Ponderosa and Bonanza brands, has denied a report that it was ready to file for bankruptcy and said Wednesday that it was working with its lenders to restructure its debt. - NRN

Post new comment

The content of this field is kept private and will not be shown publicly.
Notifications